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BOOK REVIEWS
THE Ruu-MAKING AUTHORITY IN THE ENGLISH SUPREME CouRT, by Samuel
Rosenbaum. Boston, The Boston Book Co., 1917, pp. xiv, 321.
This volume is the fourth in the Unh'.ersity of Pennsylvania Law School
Series, and is the work of a fellow of that school during the years 1913-1915.
In common with the other books of the series, its object is- to aid the scientific
study of legal problems and to help to improve the law. No subject, surely,
is more worthy of presentation to American readers than this, and none
is more full of important suggestions for the improvement of our practice.
American pleading and practice is in a very chaotic condition. We have
every variety represented among our States and further variations in the
federal eourts. Some systems give reasonable satisfaction. Most of them do
not. The Code, after two-thirds of a century of experiment, has not realized
the hopes of its friends, and for many years no new recruit has joined the
ranks of the Code States. The difficulty with the Code is its inflexibility,
due to the fact that it is a system of legislative rather than judicial rules.
The common law itself did not tie the hands of the courts so completely as
do the provisions of the Code. And most of those American States which
have not adopted the Code are provided with some other system of legislative rules of practice no less rigid and mandatory.
Recently, under the leadership of New Jersey, the question of freeing
the courts from the arbitrary and inefficient control of the legislature over
their rules of procedure has come strongly into the foreground, and it may
be said, I think, thai: there is at the present time a strong current of public
opinion setting in the direction of procedure by rules of court. The Board
of Statutory Consolidation of New York reported in favor of the adoption
of such a system in 1915. Colorado (Laws Ig13, Ch. 121), Virginia (Laws
l9I6, Ch. 521), and Alabama (Laws 1915, No. 537), have recently enacted
legislation looking toward the same end. And there is now pending in the
Congress of the United States legislation putting the entire procedure on the
law side of the federal courts under the control of the rule making authority of the Supreme Court. (H. R 7572.)
In view of the wide-spread dissatisfaction with legislative systems of
procedure, and the definite trend toward court control which is apparent in
this country, a book for American readers upon the rule-making power of
the English Supreme Court is exceedingly timely The English system is the
model for all modern efforts toward court-made procedure in this country,
and only by a study of the English rules can one become familiar with the
possibilities of the system and the progress which has been made under it.
The book under review is the best, and one might almost say the only,
treatment of the subject from the viewpoint of the American lawyer. The
author treats the subject historically, and traces the gradual growth, through
forty years, of the English system of judicial control of procedure. The direction in wh~ch that development has been the most fruitful, the imperfec-
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tions which were gradually eliminated by changing old rules and introducing new ones, the vast ingenuity displayed by the judges in discarding
outgrown precedents and in constantly holding the practice abreast of the
exacting demands of the day, are all set before the reader in a most scholarly
and interesting way. It might be regretted that the author has hot found
it advisable to argue more agressively the availability of the fundamental
principles of the ~nglish system to the needs of the United States. Missionary work along this line seems to the writer of this review a duty incumbent upon all who are qualified to undertake it. But one must, of course,
set limits to any book, and within the limits adopted, Mr. Rosenbaum has
performed a real service. The dissemination of information about the highly
successful cot1rt-ru1e system of procedure will of itself constitute an effective propaganda in its favor, and will help to ed11cate the American public
to demand something better than the technical and cumbersome procedure
which has long tended to make every American law suit a contest of endurance.
EnsoN R SuNn~RI.AND.
MAGNA CARTA AND OTH~R Ann~ss~s, by William D. Guthrie, New York.
Columbia University Press, 1916; pp. 282.
Some time ago an English historian whose studies of Domesday Book are
a monument to erudition and exact research spoke somewhat disparagingly
of excursions into history by lawyers. To his mind it too often involved a
desertion of science for mere superstition, with the result that legal history
became not a presentation of facts as they were, but what some bygone
judge or writer supposed the facts to have been. And in conclusion he
said he could but "gaze in wonder at great intellects bowing themselves in
homage before the blunders of the past, acute minds submitting to the
fetish worship of 'our books' and helpless in the presence of what I have
termed 'the long ju-ju 0£ the law'." The address which gives title to the
present voltlme is s~rcely a good answer to this stringent critidstrt.
Mr. Guthrie has sought to perpetuate the numerous myths which have
grown up round the Great Charter. For there is a purely fictitious Magna
Carta. During the struggles between parliament and the first two Stuarts,
perhaps through the influence of Coke, it seized the popular imagination and
became to the free Englishman the fundamental guarantee of his liberties.
This notion was further developed and fastened upon English lawyers by
certain writers, notably Blackstone, in the uncritical eighteenth century, Now
this would be harmless enough were it not that it attributes to the charter
what is in reality the slow and painful development of six hundred years.
Of this traditional view Mr. Guthrie is an exponent. He assumes that
the .charter was a great popular document because it was exacted from a
king. To him the principle of Habeas Corpus is implicit in it and he even
goes so far as to say that "the idea that the fundamental laws of the land
*
were urtalterable and that any governmental regulation or edict to the
contrary should be treated as void and null is plainly enuns:iated in the first
chapter of Magna Carta." Of course Mr. Guthrie knows that despite some
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dicta and the strange doubtful case of Dr. Bonham the English courts have
never assumed the power of declaring a statute void because it conflicted
with any provision of Magna Carta. But one passes from one surprise to
another. ]udicimu pariitm of chapter' 39 refers to trial by jury and le.r terrae
means "the law of the land" or "due process of Ja\v." This is to perpetuate
an error that even Coke did not make. Probably of the whole charter no
single clause is more distinctly reactionary, and in after days these words
were worshipped because, as Maitland has pointed out, it was possible to
misunderstand them. In brief Mr. Guthrie takes the position that in Magna
Carta we have an enunciation of fundamental principles which is valuable
for all time. This rests upon the assumption that there is no substantial
difference between the social structure of the thirteenth century and that of
today; moreover it treats law as something static instead of a growing living
organism.
In th.e remaining nine addresses Mr. Guthrie shows to better advantage.
A sturdy conservative, an able defender of the courts in the face of popular
criticism, he combines unusual power of exposition with a style which even
the most controversial subject cannot rob of its urbanity. He is a vigorous
defender of the older conception of constitutional law; he would maintain
our political institutions in stat1' quo. Naturally he attacks such innovations
as the Workmen's Compensation Act, the referendum, the recall of judges,
etc. With much that Mr. Guthrie says the reviewer is in sympathy but, as
already indicated, he cannot accept the general point of view. If our legal
system is to survive the stress of present conditions, it must be through
the efforts of lawyers who combine an intelligent knowledge of the past with
vision for the future. And in view of the eminence of Mr. Guthrie's position
one has the greater regret that his convictions should lead him to assume
the role of la11dator temporis acti.
WILLARD BARBOUR.
Vo'.rING TRusTs: A CHAPTER IN RECENT CORPORATE HISTORY, by Harry A.
Cushing, of the New York Bar, New York. The Macmillan Company, 1915; pp. 215.
This book discusses the subject of Voting Trusts under the titles of the
significance of Voting Trusts, their contents, and the law relating _thereto,
together with forms thereof.
Under the first part there is traced a history of the subject and some of
the advantages and disadvantages and the most usual terms of such trusts
are pointed out.
The second part is an extensive review of the important provisions in a
very large number of recent Voting Trusts, and the third part reviews in
a rapid way the decisions relating to the subject, and points out the different
views of the courts in reference to the policy and validity of Voting Trusts.
Mr. Cushing is unquestionably favorably inclined toward such trusts so
long as their purpose is not clearly illegal; he points out wherein they have
been and usually are beneficial, especially in the reorganization of corporations and the adoption of a policy that is likely to insure success through a
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series of years. He, however, also notes that there have been some cases
in which these desirable results have not been attained. The forms given include four complete voting trust agreements, many special provisions included
in trust certificates, and the provisions for the extension and termination of
such trust agreements.
This· will be found of value to any one who is interested in drawing up
documents for purposes of this kind, and fo part II there is described the
business side 0:£ the matter, as it has actually been worked out in many cases.
The book will be valuable to any lawyer who has need of information upon
the legal phases of the questioil, and will also furnish interesting reading for
the layman who is anxious to learn something of the process of control of
corporations by such methods.
H. L. Wwms.
Tar: .AD11UNIS'tRA'tION oF Jus'tICE IN CRIMINAL MA't'tERS (IN ENGLAND AND
WALES), by G. Glover Alexander, M.A., LL.M. Cambridge University Press, 1915; pp. x, 235.
The preface of this small work tells us that "it is intended as a first book
for newly appointed justices of the peace, superior police officers, and law
students; that it is hoped that it will also appeal to a larger class of general
readers who are interested in subjects bordering on the domain of law, history, politics and sociology:" Hardy as that broad purpose seems, it is fairly
accomplished, for, while readers other than justices, police officers, and law
students, of England, will "find that some of the material is not grist for
their mills, the mechanical construction of the book will facilitate the process
of selection.
Parts I and II deal with the judicial administration of criminal law, the
organization of the courts and the procedure therein, particular attention
being given to the justice of the peace. Part III deals with the relation of
the executive to crime-the prerogative of mercy, extradition, police, prisons,
etc. Part IV contains a discussion of some recent legislation, dealing with
parole, and with special classes of offenders, children, lunatics, and habitual
criminals, together with some meager statistics of crime.
It is obviously impossible to cover such a broad field as is indicated by
this synopsis with any fullness of detail. Yet, in spite of this the outstanding
feature of the work is its realism. To the lawyer, especially, who so seldom
finds in his professional literature anything except the positive rules of law,
with reasoning more or less technical and artificial in justification of the
rules, it will be almost a shock to read this author's practical discussion of
the actual working of the English criminal law. The following illustrates the
point: "The jury have a right to return a general verdict of Guilty or Not
Guilty; and that being the case, however legislators and lawyers may define
and refine as to the legal distinction between murder and manslaughter, and
however well an intelligent jury may appreciate the subtle differences between them, as lucidly explained by a learned judge, it always remains open
to the jury so to find the facts as to bring the case under either head. Hence
it has been said that murder is a crime for which a jury of twelve of his

66

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

fellow countrymen unanimously think that a man ought to be hanged, and
manslaughter is a crime for which such a jury think he ought not to be
hanged, but to receive some lesser degree of punishment. Only so are the
dry bones of malice prepense articulated into a working system, yet how seldom are we presented with anything more than the bones.
EDGAR N. DURFEE. .
THI> LAw OJ! ELECTRICITY, by Arthur F. Curtis of the New York Bar, Albany,
N. Y. Matthew _Bender & Co., 1915; pp. lxxxiv, 1033·
The author realizes that he is not dealing with any recognized branch
of i urisprudence. Rather he follows the legal problems arising by reason of the use of electricity through many branches of the law, stich_ as
contracts, torts, corporations, municipal corporations and many others. The
fundamental principles of these subjects are largely assumed, except as
they may find special application in cases involving or growing out of the
use of electricity. In this manner the author undertakes to include discussion of electrolysis, electrical injuries, powers, duties and regulation of
electrical companies, eminent domain, taxation, electrical contracts, municipal
ownership, abutting owners, interference with currents, injuries to appliances,
conduits, street railways, master and servant and e".idence. As possibly more
than half of the decisions have been rendered in the last ten years, the
timeliness of a collection and discussion of these cases in a single volume
is apparent. The work covers the decisions of the United States, England
and Canada.
Enwm C. GODDARD.

